Suchergebnisse

Subsequent to the filing ofBadham v. Eu, the 1984 California elections provided classic examples that pervasive gerrymandering has become the newest form of voting dilution. On a statewide basis, Republican congressional candidates in California captured a clear majority of the two-party vote, yet won only 18 of the 45 seats (or 40 percent). Congressional district lines were drawn by incumbent Democrats in Congress and ratified by the heavily Democratic California legislature.It is probably little exaggeration to term the California legislature a self-perpetuating oligarchy, accountable primarily to itself by the act of carefully fencing voters in and out of districts calculated to preserve the status quo, regardless of all but monumental shifts in voter sentiment or population mobility. In other states (e.g., Indiana) the legislative oligarchies are Republican.Does this type of voter debasement call for another bold move—as in 1964—by the United States Supreme Court? To many, this understandably seems to be the thorniest part of the "political thicket" that the late Justice Frankfurter had cautioned his colleagues to avoid. But, having entered it in 1964 and after, can the judiciary now ignore this new dimension of malapportionment? It is tempting to leave the problem to the "give-and-take" of the political process. But the process itself is closer to one of monopoly than of free competition. A quarter century ago the problem of malapportionment (geographically defined) was virtually immune from political remedies for much the same reasons.

Subsequent to the filing of Badham v. Eu, the 1984 California elections provided classic examples that pervasive gerrymandering has become the newest form of voting dilution. On a statewide basis, Republican congressional candidates in California captured a clear majority of the two-party vote, yet won only 18 of the 45 seats (or 40 percent). Congressional district lines were drawn by incumbent Democrats in Congress and ratified by the heavily Democratic California legislature.It is probably little exaggeration to term the California legislature a self-perpetuating oligarchy, accountable primarily to itself by the act of carefully fencing voters in and out of districts calculated to preserve the status quo, regardless of all but monumental shifts in voter sentiment or population mobility. In other states (e.g., Indiana) the legislative oligarchies are Republican.Does this type of voter debasement call for another bold move—as in 1964—by the United States Supreme Court? To many, this understandably seems to be the thorniest part of the "political thicket" that the late Justice Frankfurter had cautioned his colleagues to avoid. But, having entered it in 1964 and after, can the judiciary now ignore this new dimension of malapportionment? It is tempting to leave the problem to the "give-and-take" of the political process. But the process itself is closer to one of monopoly than of free competition. A quarter century ago the problem of malapportionment (geographically defined) was virtually immune from political remedies for much the same reasons.

Gerrymandering—the intentional manipulation of legislative boundaries for political advantage—is a venerable practice. Why, then, some might wonder, should we pay greater attention to it at this time? In particular, should judicial inquiry into constitutional issues of fair representation, intense for some two decades, now turn to what may well seem to comprise the heart of the "political thicket"? Throughout this period of reapportionment litigation, federal courts have alluded to the problem, with increasing concern shown by members of the Supreme Court of the United States, about its importance (e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 103 S. Ct. 2653: 1983). Is the time ripe for a direct judicial examination of the gerrymander on constitutional grounds? And, if so, does California comprise an appropriate test case?Prerequisite to answering such questions are: (1) an understanding of how and why gerrymandering, in magnitude, extent, and impact, has become an essentially new kind of issue rather than a mere extension of a traditional practice; and (2) a need to develop judicially manageable standards of identifying gerrymanders.Prior to the reapportionment revolution of the 1960s, there existed a variety of constraints that conditioned boundary manipulation. For one thing, a large number of states simply failed to redistrict for several decades, the situation that triggered Baker v. Can (369 U.S. 186: 1962), Wesberry v. Sanders (376 U.S. 1: 1964), et al. This resulted in great disparities in population among districts, a form of "silent" or "status quo" gerrymander that in practice minimized periodic boundary manipulation. For example, district lines for Congress were typically redrawn only in states—usually a minority—that lost or gained seats.

Gerrymandering—the intentional manipulation of legislative boundaries for political advantage—is a venerable practice. Why, then, some might wonder, should we pay greater attention to it at this time? In particular, should judicial inquiry into constitutional issues of fair representation, intense for some two decades, now turn to what may well seem to comprise the heart of the "political thicket"? Throughout this period of reapportionment litigation, federal courts have alluded to the problem, with increasing concern shown by members of the Supreme Court of the United States, about its importance (e.g.,Karcher v. Daggett, 103 S. Ct. 2653: 1983). Is the time ripe for a direct judicial examination of the gerrymander on constitutional grounds? And, if so, does California comprise an appropriate test case?Prerequisite to answering such questions are: (1) an understanding of how and why gerrymandering, in magnitude, extent, and impact, has become an essentially new kind of issue rather than a mere extension of a traditional practice; and (2) a need to develop judicially manageable standards of identifying gerrymanders.Prior to the reapportionment revolution of the 1960s, there existed a variety of constraints that conditioned boundary manipulation. For one thing, a large number of states simply failed to redistrict for several decades, the situation that triggeredBaker v. Can(369 U.S. 186: 1962),Wesberry v. Sanders(376 U.S. 1: 1964),et al.This resulted in great disparities in population among districts, a form of "silent" or "status quo" gerrymander that in practice minimized periodic boundary manipulation. For example, district lines for Congress were typically redrawn only in states—usually a minority—that lost or gained seats.

AbstractCurrent wave of redistricting will produce most nearly equally populated districts in history. It also promises the most extensive gerrymandering which "will become firmly institutionalized unless the court gives the problem prompt and positive attention".